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THE EVoLUTIoN oF THE CAr-
MAkING INDUSTrY
Mass-production, cars, pollution – they all have long become well known and well connected phenomena of 
the modern life. Nowadays the people can also add to the list such items like awareness, scientific approach, 
long-term thinking, and environmental responsibility. They are surrounded by a multitude of consumer 
goods, most of which are produced in a scientific manner, and all of which will more sooner than later end 
up in the garbage. Cars are the most noticeable – both by size and by numbers – and also the most expen-
sive of all the mass products in people’s view. For many of them they are a clear target for reprimand and 
regulation, and, as a result, the automotive industry is being increasingly brought under bureaucratic con-
trol, together with its whole supplier and distributor network. The author started writing this article in an 
attempt to place the above process under scrutiny, because it is his firm belief that similar measures, similar 
tough governmental control will inevitably spill over to other industries, which at the moment are produc-
ing more inconspicuous, but still polluting products. The present paper shows the relationship between car-
making, supply chain management and the efforts of public administration to protect the environment – 
a connection with clear practical implications.
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“Man made the cars to take us over the road”
James Brown and Betty Jean Newsome
The complexity of the modern production processes re-
quires coordination of highest precision. An industrial 
entity without detailed logistics will simply never sur-
vive. Moreover, plain internal logistics is not enough 
for survival any more. The processes of design, pro-
duction, delivery to customers, then after-sales mainte-
nance and servicing become more and more complicat-
ed, and, as a result, involve more and more independent 
organizations into the planning and effectuation beside 
the core “brand builder”. These points beyond the 
boundaries of a single company, and demands strategic 
cooperation between producers, suppliers and service 
providers. In this regard it is far from surprising that in 
the theatre of industrial thinking the concept of Supply 
Chain Management (SCM) has become a prima donna. 
The significance of broad long-term approach is further 
enhanced by another factor – national and international 
regulation. Administrative measures – the basic attri-
butes of human development – can influence company 
strategies for years ahead.
Car-Making and Supply Chains
The automotive industry has been providing an excel-
lent research field for all SCM-addicted scholars for 
decades. Toyota Motor Corporation, which after years 
of steady development finally toppled General Motors 
from the top global sales position, is baking in the lime-
light of business attention, and it has become scientifi-
cally fashionable to examine its success. Interestingly, 
the most famous product of Toyota is not a car model, 
but a business model, a production concept with the 
slick name of TPS.
If you decide to Google search for Toyota Produc-
tion System, you will receive more than a million re-
sults in a fraction of a second.  Those fellow Googlers 
who would try to check the more popular “Just In 
Time” phrase, attributed to Kiichiro Toyoda, shall 
be ready to sift through millions of results, even if 
linked together with words like “production”, “manu-
facturing” or “automotive”! Studying the evolution 
of Toyota’s concept, some authors, including Keith 
Oliver, the person who introduced the term of “Sup-
ply Chain Management” back in 1982, may point out 
non-automotive roots: “Taiichi Ohno, the father of 
the Toyota Production System, was inspired by the 
modern grocery store in the 1960s.” (Laseter – Oliver, 
2007). Others, like Toyota Motor Manufacturing Ken-
tucky, Inc. (www.toyotageorgetown.com) definitely 
and proudly put the “blame” on a 
fellow American, the first automo-
tive mass producer. Reading the 
following lines we cannot deny the 
“Just-in-time feeling”:
We  have  found  in  buying 
materials that it is not worth 
while  to  buy  for  other  than 
immediate  needs.  We  buy 
only  enough  to  fit  into  the 
plan  of  production,  tak-
ing  into  consideration  the 
state of transportation at the 
time.  If  transportation  were 
perfect  and  an  even  flow  of 
materials  could  be  assured, 
it would not be necessary to 
carry  any  stock whatsoever. 
The carloads of raw materials would arrive on 
schedule and in the planned order and amounts, 
and  go  from  the  railway  cars  into  production. 
That  would  save  a  great  deal  of  money,  for  it 
would give a  very  rapid  turnover and  thus de-
crease the amount of money tied up in materials. 
With bad transportation one has to carry larger 
stocks.
Ford (1922)
Whatever other roots the TPS might have, the 
American automotive genealogy is undisputable. 
Toyota’s engineer Taiichi Ohno in his book “Toyota 
Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production 
(Ohno, 1988) openly acknowledges the influence of 
Henry Ford. His editor later similarly confirms, “When 
I subsequently asked Mr. Taiichi Ohno, ‘How did you 
discover the Toyota Production System?’ His answer 
was, ‘I read Henry Ford’s book Today and Tomorrow’ 
(Bodek, 2006). It is ironic, that Toyota started to really 
perfect its lean manufacturing system approximately 
at the same time, when Ford Motor Company really 
abandoned it (see Figure 1). “The comfortable maturity 
into which American industry drifted during the 1950s 
and 1960s disrupted the evolutionary progress of the 
American System. Confident that the age-old ’problem 
of production’ was firmly in check, American manag-
ers redirected their efforts away from the shop floor 
and towards marketing and finance (Abernathy – Corc-
oran, 1983). The time proved the Japanese car-maker to 
be right. It is not the objective of this paper to analyze 
in detail the development of internal processes within 
Toyota, that is why I turn directly to the activities out-
side the company.
With the introduction of lean manufacturing, with 
the stock of supplies reduced to the minimum, quality 
requirements became tighter – there was no room for 
faulty parts, everything had to be perfect. To make 
that possible, Toyota needed appropriate suppliers. 
This was exactly the domain where Toyota’s unique-
ness became clearly evident – the Japanese car-maker 
with an unprecedented supportive attitude shaped its 
suppliers in its own image! In 1943 Toyota officially 
founded  Kyohokai – a voluntary organization of its 
parts suppliers (http://www.kyohokai.gr.jp/khktowa/
kyohokaioutline/e_outline.htm). The next similar as-
sociation was established in Japan only eleven years 
later, by Nissan. More than half  a century later these 
Japanese associations remained strong examples of 
mutually beneficial partnership, as evaluated by the 
members themselves in a paper by Sako (1995), who 
examined 11 such organizations. Among them Toyo-
ta suppliers are standing out – they have the highest 
opinion about the benefits of their membership: “Toy-
ota’s association, with its longstanding history and 
its concerted effort to diffuse the Toyota Production 
System, is different both in the magnitude of benefits 
it brings to its members and the function it fulfills.” 
(Sako, 1995). It is worth noticing that the subjects of 
the research were really important partners of Toyota, 
as they were taking up to 98%  of its Total Parts Pur-
chasing Cost.
Figure 1
Source: Timeline of Manufacturing Excellence,
2007 (extract)
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The fastest technology transfer is again linked to 
Toyota. Lieberman et al. (1997) demonstrate a signifi-
cant correlation between Toyota Association member-
ship and the supplier’s productivity (cited by Dyer – No-
beoka, 2000). We are witnessing a deliberate production 
technology transfer, which is the result of Toyota’s long-
term thinking. This example is another proof that Supply 
Chain Management is a successful strategic approach to 
intercompany cooperation. From reducing redundant 
stocks and eliminating inefficient movements, through 
removing unnecessary actions, improving processes 
and, finally, coordinating and developing suppliers we 
arrive to the end-users, as shown on Figure 2. The evolu-
tion of the Supply Chain Management concept has led to 
the present state, where we do not speak about compet-
ing companies any more, but about competing Supply 
Chains (Vonderembsea et al., 2006).  In 
this regard Figure 2 already seems too 
simple and outdated compared to Fig-
ure 3.
As evolution never stops, if we 
closely examine the next figure – Fig-
ure 4, we can discover further devel-
opment in the automotive supply chain 
management. Namely, beside mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) there are the 
strategic alliances between automo-
tive manufacturers. In the following 
diagrams I am splitting the process 
into three steps. The first step shows 
the formation of independent supply 
chains (Figure 5a). Later coordination 
between the core brand builders be-
Figure 3 
Types of intercompany business process links
(Source: Lambert and Cooper, 2000)
Figure 2
Supply Chain Management
(Source: Ballou et al., 2000)
comes inevitable (Figure 5b), though joint projects do 
not abolish the competition between them.1 In the end 
some core brand builders merge or form long-term stra-
tegic alliances in order to benefit from joint research 
and development, economies of scale and shared distri-
bution channels (Figure 5c).
(Figure 5a)
(Figure 5b)
(Figure 5c)
The earlier mentioned Figure 4 includes “Regula-
tions for environment and safety”, which raises another 
thought as well: what is their impact upon Supply Chain 
Management, and what are the responsibilities they 
bring to the automakers? While studying this particular 
area, I will disregard the question of safety regulations 
here, since they are incorporated into automotive de-
sign and production in the same way as other customer 
expectations, e.g. comfort and anti-theft features. To en-
sure the vehicle is technically safe on the road is not an 
issue, because after the cars are sold to the customers 
the producer is naturally willing to provide all the nec-
essary maintenance parts, similarly to the service net-
work, which is more than happy to sell its maintenance 
and repair services as long as the vehicle is in use. In 
other words, the market takes good care of it.
Environmental regulations have a different impact. 
On the one hand, the governments are becoming 
more and more restrictive regarding emissions related 
to production and the following use of the vehicles. 
From the manufacturing point of view no factory, no 
assembly plant will ever receive a licence for opera-
tion, if their production processes are not duly certified 
as meeting emission standards. All new vehicles must 
similarly meet current regulations. This must obviously 
be taken into consideration well in advance over the 
whole length of the supply chain, increasing costs.
On the other hand, a totally new aspect has come 
into view, and, strangely enough, it emerges only after 
the vehicles get out of use. In other words, when the 
product has left the supply chain, which has been coor-
dinated and controlled by the carmaker. We are witness-
ing another phenomenon in the automotive history.
“Oh, dear, we are losing our chains...
Personal observation
Is There Life after Supply Chain? The Supply Circuit
The general supply chain concept follows the prod-
uct to the end-user. Since the very beginning of the au-
tomotive age, when keeping a vehicle already made no 
economic sense to its last owner as opposed to having 
another one, the car was stripped of all usable parts and 
Figure 4.
Global Automobile Market Scenario
(Anonymous, 2007
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literally dumped out of the supply chain of the auto-
motive manufacturing. The carmaker had no interest in 
it, with the rare exception when it had special museum 
value. In the sixties-seventies of the 20th century the 
industrial progress created a strong demand for scrap 
metal, which added value to the End-of-Life-Vehicles 
(ELVs), but did not change the routine attitude of the 
car manufacturers. They still did not need the ELVs; in-
stead, the market was left “to clean the stables”, and it 
slowly became clear that humanity was facing a new 
environmental threat. When cars were considered luxu-
ry, their numbers were low. When the cars were made of 
steel and natural materials, and had an expected life of 
20+ years, nobody was really concerned about the waste 
they would eventually produce. But time flies, cars have 
long become a mass product with comparatively short 
life span. A modern vehicle contains less and less steel 
and more and more plastics: “The consumption of plas-
tics/composites in US-built automobiles increased from 
79.2 kg in 1978 to 109 kg in 1992. By 2000 the aver-
age weight of an automobile is about 1350 kg contain-
ing 135 kg of plastics.” (Nourreddine, 2006). Figure 6 
shows materials in an average EU-produced car: apart 
from metals it contains 9.3% plastics, plus 5.6% rubber 
and 9.7% “others”. 
According to the official website of the European 
Commission, discarded cars generate between 8 and 
9 million tonnes of waste each year in the European 
Union only (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/
elv_index.htm). The unusable parts in fact are danger-
ous waste, and as such must be treated accordingly. 
In many industrially developed countries the growing 
environmental sentiment of the population positively 
influences the business policies of the car manufactur-
ers, but a strong wish to build a proper image has never 
been sufficient in environmental matters, even though 
processing waste is in itself a profitable business. This 
insufficiency is clearly confirmed in a recent report re-
lated to ELVs in the EU:
In many firms, there is unwillingness to take-up 
known  innovative  technology  until  it  has  been 
widely proved to be commercial. This leaves few 
market opportunities for technology to be proved 
commercially and, as a  result,  it may never be 
proved. Here,  rational behaviour by  individual 
firms  (each  looking  after  their  individual  risk) 
does not lead to the best outcome for the market 
as a whole (a market failure).
Commission of the
European Communities
(2007)
But who shall carry this cross 
if not its creator itself? On in-
dividual level it can hardly be 
expected from the last user of 
the vehicle to solve the problem 
alone, just because the last users, 
as a rule, shall be extremely cost 
sensitive – nobody will seriously 
presume that old vehicles are 
driven by rich environmentalists. 
In countries, where deregistra-
tion and scrapping of ELV im-
poses administrative and finan-
cial burden on the last owner, the 
temptation is still high to dump 
it somewhere2 and claim it had 
been stolen, or search for another 
loop in the law.3
Therefore it was absolutely 
logical for the European Parlia-
ment and the Council to adopt the 
Directive 2000/53/EC of 18 Sep-
tember 2000 on end-of-life ve-
hicles (OJ, 2000), whose Article 
5/4 says, “Member States shall 
Figure 6
Material used in European Union car production
(Source: Association of Plastics Manufacturers in Europe, 1999 –  
cited by Kanari et al., 2003)
take the necessary measures to ensure that the delivery 
of the vehicle to an authorised treatment facility in ac-
cordance with paragraph 3 occurs without any cost for 
the last holder and/or owner as a result of the vehicle’s 
having no or a negative market value.” Moreover, the 
same Article 5 insists that the producers (i.e. carmakers 
and importers) are the ones who shall meet all, or a sig-
nificant part of, the costs of the implementation of these 
measures, and emphasizes that “the normal functioning 
of market forces should not be hindered” – a subtle hint 
on governmental elephants in china markets. 
Prevention of pollution is another indispensible as-
pect of EU legislation, and it has adequate presence 
in the above cited Directive 2000/53/EC: “Producers 
should ensure that vehicles are designed and manu-
factured in such a way as to allow the quantified tar-
gets for reuse, recycling and recovery to be achieved.” 
Here again, the responsibility of producers is clearly 
established – among everything else the Member States 
must ensure that producers shall, “in concert with mate-
rial and equipment manufacturers, use component and 
material coding standards, in particular to facilitate the 
identification of those components and materials which 
are suitable for reuse and recovery.”
In the same Directive certain responsibility is placed 
upon the end-user as well:
Article 5 § (3) Member States shall set up a sys-
tem according to which the presentation of a cer-
tificate of destruction is a condition for deregis-
tration of the end-of life vehicle. This certificate 
shall be issued to the holder and/or owner when 
the end-of  life vehicle  is  transferred  to a  treat-
ment  facility.  Treatment  facilities,  which  have 
obtained a permit in accordance with Article 6, 
shall  be  permitted  to  issue  a  certificate  of  de-
struction. (OJ, 2000)
Therefore, at the moment when the vehicle turns 
into an ELV, the last owner cannot abandon his/her ve-
hicle anymore. He/She has no choice but to take it to 
one of the certified treatment facilities, established by 
the producer under legal obligation. The legal system 
pushes the last owner back to the supply chain, and the 
end-of-life vehicles slip back into the flow of materi-
als, which is illustrated by Figure 7. The supply chain 
became a supply circuit. Even more so, there are strong 
indications that the “legislative dictatorship” of  envi-
ronmental protection is beneficial to the overall health 
of the automotive business. Those car-makers, who 
react faster to this dictate develop competitive advan-
tages. In terms of energy costs it definitely makes sense 
to consider recycling against producing from newly 
earned materials – Figure 8.
Green with environment – automotive industry 
and its impact on SCM
The environmental policy of our modern united 
Europe has always had a distinct connection to the au-
tomotive industry. Among the few first directives that 
were dealing with issues, that we now call environ-
mental, were Directive 70/157/EEC “on the approxi-
mation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
the permissible sound level and the exhaust system 
of motor vehicles” (OJ, 1970a) and Directive 70/220/
EEC “on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to measures to be taken against air pol-
lution by gases from positive-ignition engines of motor 
vehicles” (OJ, 1970b). It is only fair to mention, that 
at the beginning all directives of the European Com-
munity, which actually resulted in improved environ-
mental protection, as a matter of fact, had no particular 
aim to achieve that. Environmental protection started 
as a by-product of the Community’s harmonization 
programme (OJ, 1969), and slowly and steadily devel-
oped into a comprehensive policy. As a result the EU 
member states are setting more and more demanding 
conditions to the distribution of automotive products 
in their territories. The manufacturers can only meet 
these conditions, if they take them into consideration 
during the design process. And they really do so. E.g. 
the requirement to make 95% of vehicle weight recy-
clable by 2015 will be met by all manufacturers pro-
ducing for the EU market. The official website of FIA 
(Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile) is citing 
very confident and very understanding car-makers, 
who are equally sure that the requirements will be 
met perfectly, no matter who is talking – the European 
Mercedes Benz about its S-Class model, the Ameri-
can General Motors about its Cadillac, or the Japanese 
Honda, whose European Head of Corporate Affairs, 
Chris Rogers clearly states:
“We’ve known about  this  legislation for a long 
time. There are provisions for it in our business 
plan, and we realise  that  it  is a part of  selling 
high-quality cars in Europe.” (FIA, 2005)
The above is not just political phraseology, be-
cause non-compliance with EU requirements definitely 
means major disruption of business activities for the 
whole automotive industry. There is no other choice, 
but to comply.
Which trade is next?
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Figure 7 
Kanari – Pineau – Shallari:
End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling in the European Union
Figure 8 
Energy required to produce vehicle material
Footnote
 1 For example, the joint venture between archrivals WV and Ford, 
when they produced the triplets of WV Sharan, Seat Alhambra 
and Ford Galaxy models on the same assembly line in order to 
cover this low volume segment.
 2 In 2000, “the Year of the ELV Directive”, 238,000 ELVs were 
abandoned in the UK alone – Department of Trade and Industry 
data, cited by Fergusson (2006).
 3 E.g.: it is an open (or, at least, well unguarded) secret that not one 
Austrian ELV has been sold for as much as EUR 20 to neighbour-
ing Hungarian dwellers, who never intended to register it, nor to 
dispose of it in a proper way. 
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